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USIB-D-16.2/39  
1 November 1960

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

Validity Study on SNIE 36.2-5-59

Short-Term Prospects for Iraq

dated 15 December 1959

The attached Validity Study of SNIE 36.2-5-59 was noted by  
the Intelligence Board on 1 November 1960 (USIB-M-123, item 8. c. ).



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Executive Secretary

Attachment

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This estimate was the seventh and last in a series of SNIE's on Iraq produced in 1959 as a result of the highly volatile situation and fast-moving developments there last year. Several of these, as it turned out, overemphasized Communist prospects for an early takeover, a judgment based on the then alarming power push of the Iraqi CP and the apparent ineffectiveness of the various nationalist factions in the face of it.

SNIE 36.2-5-59, however, has held up reasonably well. It correctly forecast Iraq's growing economic problems, mounting nationalist-Communist tensions, and Qassim's continued dedication to his balancing act as between the factions. It forecast, rightly we believe, that Qassim's maneuvers would lead to growing nationalist distrust of him and eventually narrow his room for maneuver. It probably overstated the Communists' potential to chalk up lasting gains by their support of Qassim.

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